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GENETIC DISCRIMINATION:
WHY BRAGDON DOES NOT ENSURE PROTECTION
LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, J.D.*
INTRODUCTION
Susan Brown is thirty-years-old, married, and has a family history
of breast cancer. Because of this, Susan decides to be screened for
BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene mutations.1 As a result of this screening she
learns that she has a genetic predisposition to breast cancer. Susan
then decides not to have children for two reasons. First, she is con-
cerned that she would pass the genetic predisposition to breast cancer
to her children. Secondly, she is concerned about whether her life
expectancy is so affected by the potential breast cancer that she might
not live through their childhood years.
Susan is employed at a large national bank as a senior loan of-
ficer. During the course of casual conversation with a coworker, Su-
san mentions her decision not to have children and the reasons for
her decision. Several months later, she learns of an open position for
a regional manager of commercial loans. The training for the posi-
tion takes a year, and generally people in that position are in line for
further promotions to higher level management positions.
Although Susan applies and is the most qualified applicant for
the position by all criteria, she is passed over for someone with much
less experience and lower job evaluation. She learns through the
grapevine that the screening committee had discussed her predisposi-
tion to cancer and had decided against her promotion. The decision
was due to concerns that she might become ill and need time off for
treatments or, even worse, become unable to continue in the position.
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Special Programs, University of Houston Law Center; B.A., 1971, University of Kansas; J.D.,
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1. See generally THOMAS D. GELEHRTER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL GENETICS 265 (2d
ed. 1998) (describing BRCA1 and BRCA2 as breast cancer susceptibility genes which were
found as a result of observations that a distinct dominant breast cancer susceptibility could
be identified). These two genes account for 5-10% of all breast cancers. See id. Women
who have inherited the BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes have a 60-90% lifetime risk of developing
breast cancer and a 20-60% chance for ovarian cancer. See id.
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Some policymakers, advocates, and legal scholars believe that Su-
san would have a remedy for such discrimination under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA)2 because she has been discriminated
against on the basis of disability.' Some believe that the Supreme
Court's decision in Bragdon v. Abbott4 establishes a broad definition of
disability under the ADA;5 although others believe that a more gen-
eral applicability of Bragdon is not appropriate.6
As the following analysis will demonstrate, the belief that Bragdon
resolves the issue of genetic discrimination is not well founded. Un-
fortunately, this belief may be the basis for deciding that additional
statutory protections are not necessary to protect individuals from dis-
crimination on the basis of their genetic profiles. Although unlikely,
some lower courts may rely on Bragdon and other regulatory and statu-
tory interpretations to extend ADA coverage to genetic discrimina-
tion. Such holdings are even less likely after the most recent Supreme
Court decisions on whether mitigating measures should be taken into
account in defining who is disabled under the ADA.7 As this analysis
will demonstrate, it would be much better to provide additional statu-
tory protection to ensure consistent application of the ADA to genetic
discrimination.
I. THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 and its model,
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,8 provide protection against discrimina-
tion on the basis of disability for a broad spectrum of society. The
various sections of these statutes apply to almost all employers (public
2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
3. See Mark S. Dichter & Sarah E. Sutor, The New Genetic Age: Do Our Genes Make Us
Disabled Individuals Under the Americans with Disabilties Act?, 42 VILL. L. REv. 613, 617 (1997).
See also Paul Steven Miller, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 26J.L. MED. & ETHiCS 189,
190 (1998).
4. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
5. See generally Dichter & Sutor, supra note 3.
6. See George J. Annas, Protecting Patients from Discrimination-The Americans with Disa-
bilities Act and HIVInfection, 339 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1255, 1257 (1998); Wendy E. Parmet, The
Supreme Court Confronts HIV Reflections on Bragdon v. Abbott, 26J.L. MED. & Emics 225, 236
(1998). The applicability of the definition of "disability" to genetic predisposition is even
more clouded as a result of the Supreme Court's decisions on mitigating measures and
corrective devices, as will be discussed later in this Article. See Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999);
Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
7. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. 2139; Murphy, 119 S. Ct. 2133; Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. 2162; see
also infra text accompanying notes 101-121.
8. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1999).
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and private),' to a broad array of programs of public accommoda-
tion,' and governmentally provided programs and services, l ' includ-
ing higher education and health care services.
The basic provisions of both statutes prohibit covered programs
from discriminating against otherwise qualified individuals with disa-
bilities on the basis of those disabilities and require reasonable accom-
modations for those protected by the statutes. The statutes have been
the subject of an enormous body of case law, scholarly discussion, and
media attention. Several issues have received much attention, includ-
ing which programs are actually subject to the statutes, what is meant
by reasonable accommodation, and when is someone otherwise quali-
fied. The issue of who is disabled' 2 under the statute is relevant to the
issue of genetic discrimination.
The statutes do not list categories of conditions protected against
discrimination. Rather, Congress twice (in 1973 and in 1990) chose
to define disability in a more generalized way. A person with a disabil-
ity is someone who has "(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) [is] regarded as having such an impair-
ment."13 The ADA further protects from discrimination individuals
who associate with someone who is disabled under the statute. 4 This
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994) (as of 1994, employers with 15 or more employees are
subject to the ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 791 (covering federal government employees), § 793 (cov-
ering federal contractor employees), § 794 (1999) (covering employees of recipients of
federal financial assistance).
10. See Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1994) (covering 12 categories of
private providers of public accommodations, including programs of education and health
services); § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (covering private programs re-
ceiving federal financial assistance).
11. See Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994) (covering state and local
governmental programs); § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1999) (provid-
ing additional protection for those who receive federal financial assistance). Federal gov-
ernment programs provide protections to individuals through sections 501 and 504. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 791, 794 (1999).
12. See generally LAuRA F. ROTHSTEIN, DISABiLrIES AND THE LAw §§ 4.08, 4.09 (2d ed.
1997) (defining disability and applying the ADA to special situations).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994); see also id. § 12114 (excluding from the definition of
"qualified individual with a disability individuals who engage in the illegal use of drugs
when the covered entity takes action on the basis of the drug use); § 12208 (stating that the
term disabled or disability does not apply to an individual solely because that individual is a
transvestite); § 12211 (excluding homosexuality and bisexuality from being impairments
or disabilities); § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 705(9) (1999) (defining disabil-
ity as "a physical or mental impairment that constitutes or results in a substantial impedi-
ment to employment; or for the purposes of sections 701, 713, and 714 of this title and
subchapters II, IV, V, and VII of this chapter ... a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities").
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (1994).
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definition leaves several fact issues for debate, including whether a
particular condition is an "impairment," what constitutes a "major life
activity," and whether the individual is "substantially limited" in that
major life activity.
II. THE REGULATIONS
The regulations, the related commentary, and analysis of the reg-
ulations, rather than the actual statute, flesh out more expansive defi-
nitions and some guidance on these issues. The regulations define
physical or mental impairment as:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfig-
urement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the fol-
lowing body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special
sense organs, respiratory, . . . cardiovascular, reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and en-
docrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental re-
tardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental ill-
ness, and specific learning disabilities.15
Major life activities are defined as "functions such as caring for one-
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working."1 6
Lastly, substantially limits means:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular
major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or
duration under which the average person in the general
population can perform that same major life activity. 17
In addition, the factors to be considered in determining whether
someone is substantially limited in a major life activity are "(i) the
nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) the duration or expected
duration of the impairment; and (iii) the permanent or long term
impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or result-
ing from the impairment."' 8
15. 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(h) (i)-(ii) (1999).
16. Id. § 1630.2(i).
17. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii).
18. Id. § 1630.20) (2) (i)-(iii).
20001
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
When the major life activity of working is at issue, the term sub-
stantially limits means:
significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class
of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as com-
pared to the average person having comparable training,
skills, and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particu-
lar job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the ma-
jor life activity of working.19
The regulations also clarify that having "a record of an impair-
ment" protects those with a history of, or having been misclassified as,
having mental or physical impairments that substantially limit one or
more major life activities.2"
Being regarded as having an impairment means:
(1) [Having] a physical or mental impairment that does not
substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a
covered entity as constituting such limitation;
(2) [Having] a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits major life activities only as a result of the atti-
tudes of others towards such impairment; or
(3) [Having] none of the impairments defined in
paragraphs (h) (1) or (2) of this section, but is being
treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limit-
ing impairment. 21
III. EEOC INTERPRETATIONS
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the
agency charged with enforcing the ADA for employment purposes. 22
As part of its responsibility, it has issued substantial guidance on inter-
preting the requirements of the statute. The EEOC Interpretive Gui-
dance indicates that "covered entities that discriminate against
individuals on the basis of [predictive] genetic information are re-
garding the individuals as having impairments that substantially limit
a major life activity. Those individuals, therefore, are covered by the
third part of the definition of 'disability.' ,23
19. Id. § 1630.2(j) (3).
20. See id. § 1630.2(k).
21. Id.
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994). The EEOC has the authority to issue regulations to
carry out the provisions of §§ 12111-12117. See id.
23. EEOC Compliance Manual, Vol. 2, EEOC Order 915.002, Definition of the Tenn
"Disability," at 902-45, reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP., Mar. 16, 1995, at E-1, E-23. The EEOC
[VOL. 3:330
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The problem with the EEOC interpretation is that while rules is-
sued by the EEOC are entitled to judicial deference, as are all federal
agency rules, the courts are not required to accept EEOC's gui-
dance.2 ' Notably, the Supreme Court, in its opinion in Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc.,25 raises questions about the deference to be paid
to EEOC and Department of Justice guidance because no agency was
charged with interpreting the definition of "disability" under the
ADA.26 The Court further determines that the agency guidelines are
an impermissible interpretation of the ADA.27 The discounting of
agency interpretations in Sutton thus raises questions about what def-
erence the Court would give to agency interpretations on the issue of
genetic predisposition.
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
There is little legislative history regarding whether genetic condi-
tions are to be considered disabilities under the ADA.2 ' The legisla-
tive history that does exist seems to support the inclusion of coverage
on grounds similar to the EEOC interpretations.29 The limited legis-
lative history on the issue, however, has caused more than one com-
mentator to question whether Congress really thought much about
the issue at all.3 °
V. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The key arbiters of who is protected under the ADA are the
courts. Because the ADA is not explicit in its coverage, it ultimately
falls to the courts to determine whether genetic discrimination fits
within the definition of a disability. The courts have some latitude in
applying regulatory and historical guidance on this issue. Although
regulations are given deference because of the administrative require-
ments relating to their promulgation, even regulations are occasion-
used the example of an individual who had a genetic predisposition to colon cancer to
illustrate the type of genetic discrimination that would be prohibited by the ADA. See id.
24. See Dichter & Sutor, supra note 3, at 620 n.23.
25. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
26. See id. at 2145.
27. See id.
28. See generally Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment and the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 29 Hous. L. REv. 23, 34-39 (1992) (describing the dearth of informa-
tion regarding genetic disabilities and the ADA).
29. See Dichter & Sutor, supra note 3, at 625; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at §§ 4.08-4.09.
30. See Dichter & Sutor, supra note 3, at 626 n.40; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at §§ 4.08-
4.09.
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ally struck down.3 1 While the ADA regulations seem unlikely to be
ignored, the courts are ultimately left to resolve questions of statutory
interpretation.
The courts have begun to address some cases that might provide
guidance on the issue of genetic discrimination. The most significant
of these decisions to date is Bragdon v. Abbott. Bragdon is important
because it addresses an issue closely related to genetic discrimination.
The Bragdon Case
Bragdon v. Abbott involved a woman who was HIV-positive, but
asymptomatic, who sought dental treatment.32 When the dentist, who
had inquired about her HIV status, discovered that she had a cavity,
he advised her that he would fill the cavity only at a hospital, which
would require her to pay the cost of using the hospital facilities.33 Ms.
Abbott claimed discrimination under Tide III of the ADA, which ap-
plies to private providers of public accommodations and prohibits
them from discriminating against otherwise qualified individuals with
disabilities on the basis of their disabilities.34 There was no dispute
about whether Tide III applied to the dentist's office.3" There was
disagreement, however, about two other major issues. First, Dr. Brag-
don claimed that Ms. Abbott was not disabled within the definition of
the ADA.36 Second, he based his diagnosis and suggested procedure
on his view that her condition posed a direct threat to him, a defense
that has been recognized as justifying different conduct in certain
instances.
The district court granted summary judgment to Ms. Abbott hold-
ing that HIV infection is a disability under the ADA even if it has not
yet progressed to the symptomatic stage.38 The district court also held
that Abbott's treatment in Bragdon's office was not a direct threat to
the health and safety of others,3 9 and the First Circuit affirmed.4"
31. See, e.g., Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986) (striking down regu-
lations mandating reporting and investigation procedures relating to seriously ill infants as
not having a rational basis that would justify federal intervention).
32. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. CL 2198, 2201 (1998).
33. See id. at 2201.
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994).
35. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2201.
36. See id. at 2210.
37. See i





As previously noted, the ADA protects individuals who have an
impairment that substantially limits them in one or more major life
activities, including those who have a record of such an impairment
and those who are regarded as having such an impairment.41 Many
courts had interpreted this to mean one of two things. The first being
that individuals with HIV are substantially limited in the major life
activity of reproduction or secondly, that because of the stigmatizing
effect of being HIV-positive, they were regarded as having a
disability.
42
It had been generally thought that the Supreme Court's decision
in School Board v. Arline,4" holding that a schoolteacher with tuberculo-
sis was covered under the Rehabilitation Act,4 4 would control the Brag-
don case because the ADA is intended to be interpreted consistently
with the Rehabilitation Act. Furthermore, the Bragdon case presented
the Court with the opportunity to decide that anyone who is HIV-posi-
tive is disabled under the ADA.
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court vacated and re-
manded the decision of the First Circuit.45 According to the majority
opinion of Justice Kennedy, Ms. Abbott's HIV infection constituted a
disability under the ADA because it is a physical impairment that sub-
stantially limits the major life activity of reproduction. 46 Justice Ken-
nedy also held that under the direct threat provision of the ADA, the
risk of a significant health risk from treating or accommodating some-
one with HIV must be based on medical or objective evidence, not on
one's good-faith belief that a significant risk exists.4 7
The Court left open a number of issues, but it clearly held that
reproduction is a major life activity.48 This is significant due to the
fact that neither the ADA nor the regulations list had previously in-
cluded it in their respective non-exclusive lists.49 The Court then de-
termined that Ms. Abbot had demonstrated that for her, HIV status was
a substantial limitation in her decision not to procreate, due to con-
41. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995);
Bradley v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1071 (1994).
43. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
44. See id. at 289; see also §504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1999).
45. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2198, 2198 (1998).
46. See id. at 2213.
47. See id. at 2210.
48. See id. at 2204, 2206, 2209.
49. See id. at 2203 (referring to regulations issued by the Department of Justice which
adopt verbatim the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare definition of physical
impairment).
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cerns about risk to her partner in conception and risk to the child in
childbirth.5" By focusing on the facts in this case, the Court did not
say that every individual who is HIV-positive is covered.51 Although
many had hoped that the Court would address whether the "regarded
as" portion of the definition would apply, it did not. The direct threat
issue also remains unresolved. 52
The case leaves unresolved a number of issues relating to genetic
discrimination in the context of its relationship to reproduction as a
major life activity. It has been asserted that Bragdon establishes that
reproduction is a major life activity and that because Sidney Abbott
was substantially limited in that major life activity as a result of her
HIV status, a similar analysis could be applied to genetic conditions.
The argument would be that having a genetic predisposition to cer-
tain disorders could adversely affect an individual's decision to
reproduce for fear of passing on the gene mutation to the individual's
offspring. Thus, the Bragdon Court's reasoning would protect individ-
uals from discrimination on the basis of those genetic markers.
In Berk v. Bates Advertising USA, Inc.,53 a post-Bragdon decision, the
district court held that breast cancer substantially limited the major
life activity of reproduction because it made pregnancy unduly risky
and the cancer treatment included advice to have surgery that would
destroy any chance of reproduction.54 This is significant because it is
the first case in which any form of cancer was held to be a disability
because it was a substantial limitation on the major life activity of re-
production.55 Nevertheless, this case involved an individual who was
50. See id. at 2206.
51. See id. at 2206 ("In view of our holding, we need not address the second question
presented, i.e. whether HIV is a per se disability under the ADA.").
52. See id. at 2210, 2213.
53. 25 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
54. See id. at 270.
55. Cf Graham v. Rosemount, Inc. 40 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (D. Minn. 1999) (holding that
an employee claiming discrimination based on breast cancer was not qualified because of
her inability to work in a setting requiring interaction with other employees). For pre-
Bragdon cases involving cancer as a disability, see Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d
1351 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997) (holding that a psychological im-
pairment resulting from recovery from colon cancer surgery is not a covered disability);
Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assoc., Inc. 100 F. 3d 907 (1lth Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
630 (1997) (holding that the side effects of chemotherapy for lymphoma did not result in
a covered disability); Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that a woman with breast cancer who had undergone a lumpectomy and radiation
treatment was not disabled); Shea v. Village Green Care Ctr., Ltd., No. 5:97-CV-343-BR3,
1999 WL 960307 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 1998) (holding that a record of cancer can be a rec-
ord of a disability); Vendetta v. Bell Atlantic Corp., No. CIV. A. 97-4838, 1999 WL 575111
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 1998) (holding that cancer may be a disability); Madjlessi v. Macy's West,
338 [VOL. 3:330
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symptomatic, and it would be quite different to extend this to genetic
predisposition to cancer.
In another post-Bragdon case, Cornman v. N.P. Dodge Management
Co.,56 the court held that although silicone leakage and attendant
pain was not a disability,57 and the employee was not regarded as hav-
ing an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity,58
there still existed a fact issue as to whether the employee's mastectomy
to treat breast cancer constituted a disability under the "record of"
impairment prong.59 The, court, in applying the Bragdon rationale,
found that because "society clearly considers a woman's breasts to be
an integral part of her sexuality," this would negatively affect a per-
son's sexual relations in a substantial way and would thus be consid-
ered a disability under the ADA.60
A contrary view is found in Schwertfager v. Boynton Beach,61 which
involved an employee who had breast cancer and reconstructive sur-
gery. The court, in applying the Bragdon reasoning, found that
although the reconstructive surgery did affect caring for herself, dress-
ing, and cooking, and that these are major life activities, these impair-
ments were temporary.62 The court went on to hold that the plaintiff
had not demonstrated that she was regarded as having an impair-
ment, nor did she show a record of being impaired.63
In addition, two recent decisions from the Northern District of
Texas may eliminate a plaintiffs ability to argue that reproduction is a
major life activity under Bragdon. Fabio Gutwaks, who brought suit
following his dismissal from American Airlines, relied on the Bragdon
Court's holding that reproduction is a major life activity under the
ADA.' Gutwaks claimed that American Airlines discriminated against
him because he was HIV-positive. 65 The district court, citing Sutton,
explained that whether an individual is disabled under the ADA
should be determined by evaluating the "extent that the physical im-
pairment substantially limits the individual claimant's major life activi-
Inc., 993 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that breast cancer or a history of breast
cancer is not a disability).
56. 43 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (D. Minn. 1999).
57. See id. at 1070.
58. See id. at 1070-71.
59. See id. at 1071-72.
60. Id. at 1072.
61. 42 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
62. See id. at 1359-60.
63. See id. at 1360-61.
64. See Gutwaks v. American Airlines, No. 3:98-CV-2120-BF, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16833, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 1999).
65. See id. at *4, *10.
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ties."6 6 Gutwaks claimed he was limited in the major life activity of
reproduction; however, unlike the plaintiff in Bragdon, Gutwaks admit-
ted that he did not have, and never had, any desire to have children.
67
Relying on Qualls v. Lack's Stores Inc.6" and noting that Gutwak's deci-
sion not to have children was not linked to his HIV status, the magis-
trate found that reproduction was not a major life activity for Gutwaks.
Because Gutwaks could not point to another substantial limitation, he
was not disabled under the ADA.69 Although the Quals court did not
cite Bragdon or Sutton, its grant of defendant's motion for summary
judgment is consistent with both decisions, since the plaintiff failed to
offer any evidence that could show his Hepatitis C made him disabled
under the ADA. Like Gutwaks, Qualls claimed that he was substan-
tially limited in the major life activity of reproduction, however he had
undergone a vastectomy after he and his wife decided they did not
want any more children.7" Because the court could not conclude that
his inability to reproduce was linked to his Hepatitis C, the court
could not find that he was disabled under the ADA.71
As Gutwaks and Qualls illustrate, only a simplistic reading of Brag-
don would permit the conclusion that the case provides support for
ADA coverage of individuals alleging genetic discrimination. The
post-Bragdon cases involving breast cancer72 illustrate the confusion
and lack of clarity the courts have in applying the Bragdon rationale to
genetic conditions. Even if Bragdon could be found to apply to some
decisions not to reproduce because of genetic conditions, it is unlikely
that it would apply to all possible situations.
In assessing whether Bragdon established that a genetic predispo-
sition is a disability under the ADA, the starting point is whether the
condition to which the individual is predisposed is a physical impair-
ment.73 In Bragdon, the Court noted the following in determining
whether HIV infection is an impairment:
In issuing these regulations, HEW decided against in-
cluding a list of disorders constituting physical or mental im-
66. 1& at *13 (emphasis added); see infra text and notes accompanying section VII for a
discussion of the Sutton decision and its implications.
67. See id. at *14-15.
68. No. Civ.A. 5:98-CV149-C, 1999 WL 731758 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 1999).
69. See Gutwaks, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16833, at *14-16.
70. See Quails, WL 731758, at * 2-3.
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., Berk v. Bates Adver. U.S.A., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Corn-
man v. N.P. Dodge Management Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (D. Minn. 1999); Schwertfager v.
Boynton Beach, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
73. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2202 (1999).
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pairments, out of concern that any specific enumeration
might not be comprehensive. The commentary accompany-
ing the regulations, however, contains a representative list of
disorders and conditions constituting physical impairments,
including "such diseases and conditions as orthopedic, vis-
ual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epi-
lepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart
disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, and
... drug addiction and alcoholism."
HIV infection is not included in the list of specific disor-
ders constituting physical impairments, in part because HIV
was not identified as the cause of AIDS until 1983. HIV in-
fection does fall well within the general definition set forth
by the regulations, however.
The disease follows a predictable and, as of today, an
unalterable course. Once a person is infected with HIV, the
virus invades different cells in the blood and in body tissues.
[The stages of infection are detailed].
In light of the immediacy with which the virus begins to
damage the infected person's white blood cells and the se-
verity of the disease, we hold it is an impairment from the
moment of infection. As noted earlier, infection with HIV
causes immediate abnormalities in a person's blood, and the
infected person's white cell count continues to drop
throughout the course of the disease, even when the attack is
concentrated in the lymph nodes. In light of these facts,
HIV infection must be regarded as a physiological disorder
with a constant and detrimental effect on the infected per-
son's hemic and lymphatic systems from the moment of in-
fection. HIV infection satisfies the statutory and regulatory
definition of a physical impairment during every stage of the
disease.74
With regard to genetic disorders, the easiest way to consider the
coverage of the ADA in light of Bragdon is to divide them into ex-
pressed and unexpressed disorders.7" For expressed disorders, the is-
sue is merely whether the impairment constitutes a substantial
limitation of one or more major life activities. To illustrate, an indi-
vidual with symptomatic Huntington's Disease would have substantial
limitations on the major life activities of walking, thinking, and work-
74. Id. at 2202-04 (citations omitted).
75. See MICHAEL R. CUMMINGS, HuMAN HEREDITY 102-03 (1994).
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ing, among others. 76 On the other hand, an individual with mild pig-
ment-type albinism would be limited only in certain types of outdoor
employment.77
For unexpressed genetic disorders, a narrow reading of Bragdon
might suggest that under the ADA, the individual does not have an
"impairment," regardless of penetrance, severity, or other predictive
risk factors.78 So, for example, a woman's BRCA1 mutation would not
be an impairment because she is not yet affected.79
The preceding discussion, of course, applies only to individuals
who are presymptomatic or at increased risk of adult onset genetic
disorders.8 0 Individuals who are unaffected carriers of recessive disor-
ders"1 (for example, cystic fibrosis) or X-linked disorders" (for exam-
ple, Duchenne muscular dystrophy) would not be covered under even
the most expansive reading of Bragdon. However, these individuals
might be subject to discrimination in employment situations because
employers are concerned about potential health care costs of the off-
spring of these employees.83
Assuming that a court would determine, however, that an individ-
ual who is genetically predisposed to a disorder should be treated like
someone who is asymptomatic for HIV, this is only the first step of the
inquiry. As the Bragdon Court notes:
The statute is not operative, and the definition not satisfied,
unless the impairment affects a major life activity. Respon-
dent's claim throughout this case has been that the HIV in-
fection placed a substantial limitation on her ability to
76. See id. at 103.
77. See id. at 102.
78. The majority opinion in Bragdon was based to a large degree on the fact that even
an individual who was asymptomatic still had the pre-clinical effects of HIV from the mo-
ment of infection. There is a risk in using this type of analysis to distinguish asymtomatic
HIV infection from asymptomatic genetic predisposition. New developments in molecular
biology undoubtedly will indicate molecular changes in proteins and other biomarkers
that are precursors of phenotypic expression.
79. In the future, however, when technologies such as genetic biomarkers are refined,
and it is possible to measure the preclinical affects of gene mutations, then these effects
would arguably be impairments.
80. This class of potential plaintiffs would include individuals of working age who were
not symptomatic but who were at risk of developing symptoms of a genetic disorder later in
life.
81. See GELEHRTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 23. Recessive traits are defined as those
conditions that are clinically manifest only in individuals homozygous for the mutant gene
(i.e., carrying a double dose of the abnormal gene). See id.
82. See id. X-linked disease is defined as a disease that is encoded by a mutant gene on
the X chromosome. See id.
83. See Rothstein, supra note 28, at 26-30.
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reproduce and to bear children. Given the pervasive, and
invariably fatal course of the disease, its effect on major life
activities of many sorts might have been relevant to our in-
quiry. Respondent and a number of amici make arguments
about HIV's profound impact on almost every phase of the
infected person's life. In light of these submissions, it may
seem legalistic to circumscribe our discussion to the activity
of reproduction. We have little doubt that had different par-
ties brought suit they would have maintained that an HIV
infection imposes substantial limitations on other major life
activities. 4
This is where the Court hints that other major life activities are
probably affected by HIV seropositivity, 5 an analysis that if it had
been further developed might be useful in the context of genetic
conditions:
We ask, then, whether reproduction is a major life activity.
We have little difficulty concluding that it is. As the Court of
Appeals held, "[t] he plain meaning of the word 'major' de-
notes comparative importance" and "suggest[s] that the
touchstone for determining an activity's inclusion under the
statutory rubric is its significance." Reproduction falls well
within the phrase "major life activity." Reproduction and the
sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process
itself.86
And perhaps the most important step in applying the Bragdon
analysis to genetic conditions is the last element the Court addresses
in whether HIV infection is covered:
The final element of the disability definition in subsec-
tion (A) is whether respondent's physical impairment was a
substantial limit on the major life activity she asserts ....
Our evaluation of the medical evidence leads us to con-
clude that respondent's infection substantially limited her
ability to reproduce in two independent ways. First, a woman
infected with HIV who tries to conceive a child imposes on
the man a significant risk of becoming infected. The cumu-
lative results of 13 studies collected in a 1994 textbook on
AIDS indicates that 20% of male partners of women with
84. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2198, 2204-05 (1998).
85. See it at 2205. Seropositivity is defined as having a positive result to an exam that
measures serum antibody titers of infectious diseases. See ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DICTIONARY OF
MEDICINE, NURSING AND ALLIED HEALTH 1355 (5th ed. 1992).
86. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205 (citations omitted).
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HIV became HIV-positive themselves, with a majority of the
studies finding a statistically significant risk of infection.
Second, an infected woman risks infecting her child
during gestation and childbirth, i.e., perinatal transmission.
Petitioner concedes that women infected with HIV face
about a 25% risk of transmitting the virus to their children.
Published reports available in 1994 confirm the accuracy of
this statistic.
Petitioner points to evidence in the record suggesting
that antiretroviral therapy can lower the risk of perinatal
transmission to about 8%. The Solicitor General questions
the relevance of the 8% figure, pointing to regulatory lan-
guage requiring the substantiality of a limitation to be as-
sessed without regard to available mitigating measures. We
need not resolve this dispute in order to decide this case,
however. It cannot be said as matter of law that an 8% risk of
transmitting a dreaded and fatal disease to one's child does
not represent a substantial limitation on reproduction.
The Act addresses substantial limitations on major life
activities, not utter inabilities. Conception and childbirth
are not impossible for an HIV victim but, without doubt, are
dangerous to the public health. This meets the definition of
a substantial limitation. The decision to reproduce carries
economic and legal consequences as well. There are added
costs for antiretroviral therapy, supplemental insurance, and
long-term health care for the child who must be examined
and, tragic to think, treated for the infection. The laws of
some States, moreover, forbid persons infected with HIV
from having sex with others, regardless of consent.
In the end, the disability definition does not turn on
personal choice. When significant limitations result from
the impairment, the definition is met even if the difficulties
are not insurmountable. For the statistical and other reasons
we have cited, of course, the limitations on reproduction
may be insurmountable here. Testimony from the respon-
dent that her HIV infection controlled her decision not to
have a child is unchallenged. In the context of reviewing
summary judgment, we must take it to be true.87
Taking this reasoning and applying it to genetic conditions illus-
trates why Bragdon provides little assurance that the ADA adequately
protects individuals with genetic predispositions against discrimina-
tion. First, it is clear that partners of individuals with genetic condi-
87. Id. at 2205-07 (citations omitted).
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tions will not be physiologically affected. Second, depending on the
genetic condition, there is a risk of transmission (i.e., vertical trans-
mission in the case of genetics) to the child. The likelihood of the
risk, of course, varies from one genetic condition to another. For ex-
ample, it would depend on whether the mode of inheritance was
dominant, recessive, or X-linked.ss
Like HIV infection, while conception and childbirth are not im-
possible for individuals with genetic conditions, they can affect the
public health and carry with them economic costs and legal conse-
quences. Children who develop cystic fibrosis, for example, face low-
ered life expectancies and expensive long-term chronic health care
needs. This, at least, would seem to support an application of the
Bragdon analysis to genetic conditions.
The degree of risk remains unresolved. While the Court indi-
cates that even an eight percent risk of transmittability is significant,89
it is not clear how this would apply in the case of genetic conditions.
For genetic disorders with a high penetrance, such as Huntington's
disease,"° an individual with an excess number of CAG repeats would
be nearly one hundred percent likely to become symptomatic." But
what about conditions with a lower degree of penetrance or variable
expressivity? For example, how would the substantiality of risk be de-
termined in cases where the likelihood of the condition being ex-
pressed is variable, the age of onset varies, and/or the degree of
penetrance is varied and unpredictable? Add to this the question of
whether the condition is necessarily substantially limiting even if it is
expressed. For example, neurofibromatosis can range from mild caf6
au lait spots to serious growth abnormalities and deformities.9"
In addition, due to the fact that Bragdon does not allow for indi-
vidual choice to determine the level of risk but only some level of
statistical likelihood, what is to happen in instances where the degree
of risk is small, but the severity of the condition is very high?
88. A dominant mode of inheritance consists of those conditions that are expressed in
individuals with one copy of a mutant allele and one copy of a normal allele. See
GELEHRTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 23. For a definition of recessive traits see supra note 81,
and for X-linked see supra note 82.
89. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206. The Court states, "[i]t cannot be said as a matter of
law that an eight percent risk of transmitting a dread and fatal disease to one's child does
not represent a substantial limitation on reproduction." Id.
90. See GELEHRTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 217.
91. See id. at 219.
92. See Annas, supra note 6, at 1257. The Annas article raises the question of whether,
in the case of carriers of recessive genes, it is "only the couple as a couple that is disabled
(in which case the ADA does not offer protection), or is each member of the couple dis-
abled?" Id.
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Finally, there is an inherent limitation on using reproduction as
the major life activity in all cases of claimed genetic discrimination.
Future courts will probably be faced with questions of whether only
individuals of "normal" reproductive age are covered. Is the forty-five-
year-old woman who chose to defer child bearing entitled to claim a
substantial impairment? What about the eighty-year-old man who
wants to father children? This further illustrates the obvious limita-
tion that this does not protect the individuals because of what the ge-
netic condition might mean for them, only for what it might mean for
their future offspring. In the example given at the beginning of this
paper, what if Susan Brown were fifty-five and already had her chil-
dren and had a hysterectomy? She would not be affected in her major
life activity of reproduction.
VI. THE "REGARDED As" PRONG
If Bragdon does not provide the needed guidance, then what is
the likelihood that the ADA will be interpreted under any other analy-
sis to provide the desired protection? Some advocates and scholars of
disability rights believe that the Bragdon case could have been decided
on the "regarded as" prong, i.e., that individuals with HIV infection
are viewed as being substantially limited in one or more major life
activities because they are regarded as physically or mentally im-
paired.9" The Court, however, declined to provide any guidance and
stated that because the issue had not been the basis for the lower
court's decision, the issue was not properly before the Court.
One recent analysis by Dichter and Sutor of the application of the
"regarded as" prong to genetic conditions provides support for an in-
terpretation that those with HIV are regarded as substantially limited
in one or more major life activities. They noted that although both
the EEOC Interpretive Guidance and even some legislative history
would support the position for coverage,94 there are several areas of
concern with this basis for coverage. These concerns include the fact
that a broad interpretation might add potentially millions of Ameri-
cans to those covered.9" While this is a valid concern, another of the
points they raise is less compelling. Dichter and Sutor question
whether the ADA is needed to "protect individuals whose employers
take their future health, productivity and insurance costs into ac-
93. See Dichter & Sutor, supra note 3, at 622-23.
94. See id. at 620, 625-26.
95. See id. at 626. This was one of the significant reasons the Supreme Court decided to




count" when there is already adequate protection under other stat-
utes, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) (which protects employees from discrimination in insurance
based on genetic information) and the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) (which protects against discrimination or inter-
ference with employee benefits).96
While HIPAA and ERISA ensure legal protection on their face, it
can be difficult to prove violations of these statutes. Employers, who
are concerned about the potential application of HIPAA and ERISA
preventing them from discharging employees or reducing their bene-
fits after diagnosis of an illness, may be reluctant to hire employees
with genetic predispositions in the first place.
The dissent in Bragdon, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, took
the position that while asymptomatic HIV-positive status is a physical
impairment, it is questionable whether reproduction is a major life
activity.97 Even if reproduction is a major life activity, Justice Rehn-
quist would hold that HIV infection does not substantially limit that
activity.98
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF BRAGDON
Bragdon does not clearly ensure that genetic discrimination is in-
cluded within the analysis applying to HIV-positive status. The five-to-
four opinion, when combined with the language in the dissent, indi-
cates that the Supreme Court has already gone about as far as it is
prepared to go on this issue. While there is some potential that a
future case will focus more clearly on the "regarded as" prong, it
would be a mistake to rely on Bragdon to provide assurance that the
Supreme Court would extend ADA protection to genetic conditions.
As Wendy Parmet has noted, this Court does not tend to rely on
public health policy as the basis for its holdings.99 Parmet analyzes the
compelling public health policy reasons why HIV-positive individuals
should always be protected against discrimination, reaching the result
that providing such protection encourages individuals to be tested
and to seek treatment without substantial fear of being treated ad-
versely by society in the workplace and elsewhere.1" There is a similar
96. See Dichter & Sutor, supra note 3, at 631-32 (citing Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)).
97. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2214-15 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
98. See id. at 2215-16.
99. See Parmet, supra note 6, at 237 (claiming that there is a divergence between the
public health and legal perspectives).
100. See id. at 226.
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compelling justification for ensuring that individuals are protected
from genetic discrimination. It is in the public interest to have indi-
viduals tested for conditions such as colon cancer or breast cancer
where those identified as genetically predisposed to these diseases can
undergo more frequent colonoscopies, more frequent mammograms,
or other prophylactic interventions. If individuals who are tested for
various genetic conditions fear that they can be adversely affected in
employment, in obtaining health or life insurance, or in other ways,
they are far less likely to want to be tested. This is not in the best
interests of these individuals, their family members, or society.
Sutton, Murphy, and Albertsons
As the preceding discussion indicates, the Supreme Court had
already cast doubt on how broadly courts should read the definition
of "individual with a disability" under the ADA before it decided sig-
nificant ADA cases at the end of the 1998-99 term. In the cases of
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,'01 Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,"0 2
and Albertsons Inc. v. Kirkingburg,'0 3 the Court addressed the issue of
whether medication or corrective devices that can mitigate an individ-
ual's impairment should be considered in determining whether an
individual's physical or mental impairment substantially impairs a ma-
jor life activity. The Court also provided some direction on the "re-
garded as" prong of the definition.
The three cases involved individuals whose medical conditions
were correctable. In Sutton, the complaintants were twin sisters with
uncorrected visual acuity of 20/200, but whose vision was correctable
to a functional level of individuals without the impairment.10 4 They
claimed that United Air Lines' refusal to hire them as airline pilots,
based on their vision, violated the ADA.105 Murphy involved an indi-
vidual with high blood pressure who was denied the opportunity to
drive commercial vehicles.10 6 When Murphy took medication, his hy-
pertension allowed him to function normally.'0 7 The complaintant in
Albertsons also sought a position as a driver, in this case a truck driver
for a grocery chain." 8 Kirkingburg had monocular vision, and his
failure to meet Department of Transportation basic vision standards
101. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
102. 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
103. 119 S. CL 2162 (1999).
104. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2141.
105. See id.
106. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136.
107. See id. at 2135.
108. See Albertsons 119 S. Ct. at 2165.
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for commercial truck drivers was the basis for the adverse employment
decision." 9
In Sutton, the Court held that "a person whose physical or mental
impairment is corrected by medication or other measures does not
have an impairment that presently 'substantially limits' a major life
activity."11 The Court emphasized, however, that disabilities must be
evaluated on an individual basis."' The Court referred to diabetes as
an example of a condition that varies widely." 2 The Court further
rejected a position that would make a diabetic per se disabled within
the statute. 1 3 It also rejected an approach that would require that
simply because there are mitigating measures available to alleviate a
particular condition, a person with that condition is not disabled." 4
Because negative side effects of these measures might be severe, the
individual may be justified in not taking advantage of them." 5
A significant basis for the Court's decision that not all health con-
ditions should be considered as disabilities was the legislative history,
which estimated forty-three million as the approximate population of
individuals who have one or more physical or mental disabilities." 6
This number is significantly less than the 160 million Americans who
would be included under an approach that looks at "all conditions
that impair the health or normal functional abilities of an individual
"117
The Court also addressed whether the plaintiffs with visual im-
pairments fit within the "regarded as" prong of the definition." 8 The
Court stated there are two ways that one falls within this prong of the
analysis: (1) when a covered entity mistakenly believes a person has a
physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities, or (2) when the entity mistakenly believes that an actual,
non-limiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life
activities. "' In both situations, the entity must have misperceptions
about the individual that often "resul[t] from stereotypic assumptions
109. See id. at 2165-66.
110. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-47.
111. See id. at 2147 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 1296 (1998)).
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. The Court states, "a person whose physical or mental impairment is cor-
rected by mitigating measures still has an impairment .... " Id.
115. See id. at 2147.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 2148.
118. See id. at 2149-50.
119. See id.
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not truly indicative of ... individual ability."1 ' In Sutton, the Court
held that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately allege that poor eye-
sight is regarded as an impairment that substantially limits them in the
major life activity of working in a broad range of airline pilot positions
for which they are qualified.121
Applying this reasoning to Bragdon's analysis of genetic predispo-
sitions raises additional questions about whether genetic conditions
would be considered disabilities or at least whether genetic conditions
should be defined as disabilities in all situations. First, it seems obvi-
ous that there will be a difference with respect to individuals depend-
ing on whether they have genetic markers that affect them
individually or whether they will affect only offspring. In addition,
there will probably be a difference whether the individual is currently
impaired or only predisposed to the condition. In addition, it would
then seem to matter whether the condition is one that is itself substan-
tially limiting or one that may be regarded as substantially limiting.
Based on Sutton, Murphy, and Albertsons, combined with Bragdon, any
attempt to assert that a particular genetic predisposition is per se a
disability entitled to statutory protection as interpreted by the
Supreme Court is highly questionable.
Assuming that there are some conditions that the courts would
agree are substantially limiting, there is the additional question as to
whether mitigating measures, such as birth control measures, gene
therapy, genetic counseling, fetal therapy, or voluntary termination of
pregnancy, should be taken into account in cases involving substan-
tially limiting genetic conditions. These questions will require an as-
sessment of whether such "mitigating measures" are even available or
affordable, what the risks are, and, of course, whether public policy
bars their consideration.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is far from clear that protec-
tion against discrimination on the basis of genetic predisposition is
required by the ADA through its judicial and regulatory interpreta-
tions. Bragdon simply does not decide this issue and more recent
Supreme Court decisions cast even greater doubt on the likelihood of
a broad coverage for genetic predispositions. The complexity of ge-
netic discrimination makes it particularly difficult to try to fit it within
the statutory, regulatory, and judicial guidance to date.
120. Id. at 2150.
121. See id.
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The need for protection against discrimination based on geno-
type seems obvious, although the ADA as currently written and inter-
preted does not provide clear guidelines on genetic discrimination. It
is also not entirely clear whether the statute itself must be amended,
new legislation enacted, or binding regulatory guidance through addi-
tional definitions and clarification issued to address genetic issues. It
would seem, however, based on the foregoing discussion, that there is
some doubt about how far the courts will go under the current intern
pretation of the definition. For these reasons, policymakers would do
well to focus on the best way to address this complex issue rather than
wait for the courts to act.
